經濟危機下國有經濟應對信貸緊縮的機理
――基于博弈論的分析

謝敏    李冬

(綜合開發研究院,廣東深圳 518029;深圳市曉揚投資管理公司,廣東深圳 518026

[內容摘要] 本文通過構建博弈論模型,分析了經濟危機下信貸緊縮發生的機理,進而分析了國有經濟在應對信貸緊縮中發揮的作用。本文還比較了2007年危機下美國和中國的信貸緊縮情況,對博弈模型的分析結果進行了驗證。本文的研究結果表明經濟危機下,宏觀經濟容易陷入信貸緊縮的困境,而國有經濟在應對信貸緊縮中,可以發揮一定的積極作用,但國家通過國有經濟干預宏觀經濟存在的嚴重弊端也不容忽視。

[關鍵詞] 經濟危機  信貸緊縮  國有經濟  政府  博弈

[中圖分類號] F830.2    [文獻標識碼] A    

[正文]  請下載PDF文件。

 

The Mechanism of State-owned Economy’s Responding to the Credit Crunch During Economic Crisis: An Analysis Based on Game Theory

Xie Min    Li Dong

(China Development Institute, Shenzhen 518029,

Everyoung Capital Management Ltd, Shenzhen 518026)

Abstract: Based on imperfect information dynamic game models, the author analyzed the mechanism of the occurrence of credit crunch and the mechanism of state-owned economy’s responding to the credit crunch during economic crisis. Furthermore, the author also compared the situation of the credit crunch in theUnited StatesandChinaduring 2007-2009. Our analysis implies that macro-economy tends to fall into the plight of the credit crunch during economic crisis, while state-owned economy can play a positive role in response to the credit crunch. But the serious shortcomings of government intervention also can not be ignored.

Key words: Economic Crisis; Credit Crunch; State-owned Economy; Government; Game Theory